Author ORCID Identifier
Desiree Simandjuntak: 0009-0001-2955-4758
DOI
10.65844/2549-4333.1258
Abstract
One of the ways market-based fishery governance attempts to boost sustainable fishing is through economic incentive. Offered as an above-market price to producers, it is commonly practiced in seafood certification to encourage sustainable and equitable production. However, certification is mainly inaccessible to small-scale fishers who are typically tied to pre-existing patron-client relationship, particularly those from developing economies. This study analyzes the extent to which economic incentive can benefit small-scale fishers amidst the intricate power imbalance in producer community. Based on a ten-month ethnography study in Sulawesi, Indonesia, it finds that prevalent patronage impedes participating fishers' income as it is affected by the amount and promptness of payment. Additionally, being in FTCFS stigmatizes participating fishers who trade outside its supply chain as `cheaters' because it is seen as a form of disloyalty to FTCFS. Accordingly, it delegitimizes alternative source of income, even when it is so desperately needed to survive. These findings suggest that market-based fishery governance overlooks local labor and social relations, thereby reshaping and reinforcing inequality. This study points to the need for a more nuanced understanding of the complex everyday lived experiences of small-scale fishers if we are to achieve sustainable fishery governance.
Recommended Citation
Simandjuntak, D. (2026). Patron-Client Relationship Undermines Sustainable Fishery Governance: A Case of Small-Scale Fishing Certification in Sulawesi, Indonesia. Forest and Society, 10(1), 373-385. https://doi.org/10.65844/2549-4333.1258 Available at: https://scholarhub.unhas.ac.id/fs/vol10/iss1/20
Pages
373-385
Received Date
28 February 2025
Accepted Date
20 August 2025